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Psychological states are not a prima facie natural kind, nor are 
they susceptible to straightforward empirical observation in the way that 
material objects are. It is plain though that mental states in general, and 
empirical beliefs in particular, are complexly related to their physical 
medium, causes and context, observation of which provides a means of 
access to them. These facts suggest that empirical beliefs may in some 
sense be dependent on their physical relata. This paper attempts to set 
out some of the relations that hold between empirical belief and its 
determining conditions. First, the idea of a dependence relation is 
presented. This is followed by the discussion of four such relations of 
empirical belief. Finally, some consequences are drawn about the nature 
of empirical belief and justification. A brief statement of seven 
assumptions about empirical belief which cannot be argued for here, but 
which make clear the paper's background, is appended. 
1. Relations of determination or dependence 
The idea of a dependence relation has been developed by Kim in 
the course of his discussion of one particular such relation, 
supervenience.1 A starting point for thinking about supervenience, and its 
historical origin in the literature, is Moore's initial suggestions concerning 
the supervenience of ethical properties on natural, empirically observable 
fact. The kind of dependence that the normative features of something 
have on its natural properties, has since been seen to hold between 
psychological and physical properties (possibly a special case of 
normative/natural supervenience), and between macro- and 
microphysical properties. For instance, a particular empirical belief of S's 
that the cat is over there, might be said to supervene on a causal array of 
material fact, including cat, agent, cortex and light; the colour, odour and 
viscosity of oil might be said to supervene on its microphysical structure. 
Supervenience is just one kind of dependence relation; others 
according to Kim (1984:154), are the determination of an effect by its 
cause(s) 2 and the mereological dependence of a whole on its parts. The 
1 See Kim 1978,1982,1984 especially, 1985 and 1988, especially 399-400; on 
epistemic supervenience. 
2 There are serious difficulties in taking cause/effect as a relation of 
supervenience, at least if a Moorean conception of supervenience is to be 
maintained, on which elements in the base set instantiate those in the 
dependent set. 
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notion of dependency, and its converse, determination, is central to the 
view of the world "not as a mere assemblage of unrelated objects, events, 
and facts, but as constituting a system, something that shows structure" 
(Kim, 1984:153), and central also to the intelligibility of that world and the 
possibility of explanation and understanding. 
A dependence relation holds between two different things or 
kinds of things, in a base and a dependent realm. The presence of 
individuals in the determining base realm is a necessary condition for that 
of individuals in its dependent realm (which makes a relation of this sort 
sensitive to a counterfactual test). A certain configuration of the base set is 
also sufficient to instantiate an element of the dependent realm. 
Dependence conditions differ from the usual necessary and sufficient 
conditions of logic in that a description of the states in the base set is not at 
the same time a description of states in the dependent set. The two sets 
however may have the same physical extension. It is possible to say, given 
certain elements of the base realm and the state dependent on them, that 
every exact replica of those elements will reproduce the dependent state 
too, but it is not possible to establish a nomological connection in the other 
direction and say that a certain dependent state will always be instantiated 
by base elements, x, y, z.3 In Moorean terms, it is impossible that two 
apples should differ only in this respect, that one is a good apple and the 
other not good, but goodness is not reducible to a set of natural properties. 
We might say, as a working definition of a dependence relation, 
that if realm B, a set of states b j . n with properties BP describable in 
vocabulary BV, is necessary for the instantiation of a realm D, where D = 
(s:s has properties DP describable in DV], then the elements of D depend 
on those of B. BP and DP, BV and DV, may be completely or not at all co-
extensive, but cannot, it seems, partially overlap, i.e., there may be 
dependence relations within one category (e.g., causal dependence among 
physical events) or across categories (psychophysical dependence), but an 
appearance of dependence of D partially on D itself and partially on B, 
can usually be resolved by a further reduction of D. In what follows, the 
contention is that empirical belief depends on both physical conditions 
and other beliefs, but then it must be borne in mind that these other 
beliefs are themselves dependent on physical conditions, specifically, 
those states internal to an agent's own neurological system which dispose 
him to proceed in certain ways and constitute parts of his belief system. I 
shan't undertake this further reduction here, but will speak of an empirical 
belief depending in part on other beliefs. 
3 Kim however suggests that an accommodating sort of reduction may be 
possible if we allow a wide enough disjunctive definition of the base realm 
elements on which a particular supervenience state depends 
(1984:passim). 
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The question then is "Given that any mental state supervenes on 
a complex physical array, what particular dependence relations, to what 
particular terms, are discernible in the case of an empirical belief?" There 
are it seems at least these four things on which any particular empirical 
belief Bp (read "the belief that p") of an agent S at a time t, may variously 
depend: causal physical conditions at t, including S's afferent nervous 
system and usually elements external to him, and cortical states of S at t 
which may be identified as evidential beliefs, general semantic beliefs and 
probabilistic beliefs relevant to p. 
2 Dependence relations of empirical beliefs 
11 Relevant physical conditions 
Empirical belief arises within the natural order at the instance of 
physical causes and effects. That is, some sort of cause/effect chain may 
be picked out from the circumstances of any particular belief, which is 
essential to it. Notice that both physical causes (usually external to S) and 
neurophysiological effects are necessary for the generation of an empirical 
belief; to identify the belief with only the effects is to see it as a self-
contained internal state and this opens the door to a narrow solipsistic 
materialism.4 The physical conditions relevant to any empirical belief are 
rather to be thought of as an array of physical facts definable by virtue of 
the cause/effect relations among them, upon which the belief depends. A 
word in qualification of the broad position I am taking: of course there's a 
sense in which the belief state is internal to S (he can believe falsely and in 
the absence of his belief state's reference), but the state he's in, Bp, is to be 
thought of as the effect of which p is, actually or typically, the cause, the 
idea being that effects define their causes as much as vice versa. In the 
case of a true empirical belief, content is consonant with the cause/effect 
array; in the case of a false belief, we must look to the other factors upon 
which the belief depends (vide infra) besides its cause/effect complex, to 
understand how content has parted company with its physical matrix. 
It is the nature of the afferent nervous system of a rational agent 
that, when it is brought into causal interaction with some part of its 
environment, the agent is thereby normally put in a state of readiness to 
act appropriately with regard to the fact perceived. He is apprised of some 
way in which the world is. Empirical belief may thus be acquired and held ' 
while the sensory mechanisms of the agent are engaged by the (supposed) 
objects of the belief. The force of the "normally" here is two-fold. Firstly, it 
4 Some of the problems attendant on such a view are accounting for the 
representational content of empirical belief; avoiding scepticism—if a 
belief depends on nothing outside out heads, we might all very well be 
brains in vats; and explaining cross-category causation. 
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embodies the claim that in its ordinary functioning, without handicapping 
conditions or blocks on awareness, an afferent nervous system is not just 
sensitive, but attentive to the environment.^ It automatically executes the 
interests of the agent by generating doxastic states which should enable 
his successful negotiation of his surroundings. (And this is as much as will 
be said about values as a basis of empirical belief.) Normally then, the 
agent cannot help but acquire beliefs about the environment, if his senses 
are stimulated by it. Secondly, the "normally" presupposes a standard 
rational agent, with the usual neurological and cognitive equipment-some 
experience and understanding of his world. It does not presuppose that 
the beliefs acquired in the course of sensory experience are true. 
Regrettably, it is perfectly normal to get things wrong. 
Here is a rough illustration of the physical cause/effect array 
upon which a true visual belief depends, applicable mutatis mutandis to 
doxastic states of other perceptual modes. S holds Bp at t, where p = there 
is a bend in the road before S at t Bp depends on the cause/effect array 
of: a road with a bend in it being in a certain spatial relation to S at t, a light 
source adequately illuminating it, an unobstructed visual pathway 
between the bend and S's eyes, good enough eyes, backed up a proper 
visual system, focussed on the bend, and a cortex, functioning in a normal, 
attentive mode. 
What of a false belief though-can it depend in any significant 
sense on a cause/effect array to which the beliefs content does not refer? 
The answer I think is yes, given that this is a dependence relation of 
generation and that the beliefs content is determined by other factors as 
well as its cause. For example, S believes there is a bicycle tire on the lawn 
before him at t, but the array which is the physical matrix of the belief 
includes besides all the other usual elements, a snake and no tire. Given 
S's probabilistic belief (vide infra) at t, that a snake on his lawn is 
unthinkable, the physical array is consonant with the belief. Again, S 
believes there is a bent stick in water when the stick is really straight, 
because his working semantic beliefs do not include any about refraction. 
It is thus possible to see how the cause/effect array, coupled with S's other 
beliefs at t, determine even a false current empirical belief. 
In the two examples, S did not get things badly wrong. He was 
mistaken only as to particular properties of the objects in the experience 
and much of the physical array was still directly correlative with the belief. 
In a case of grossly disordered experiential belief, as when a hospitalized 
and hallucinating S believes there are pink rats on the dungeon wall 
before him, and the belief depends on a pathological brain state induced 
by toxins, then this particular dependence relation is not so important in 
5 The homuncular idiom here is harmless; the point could as well be made 
by saying that the agent is not just sensitive to the environment through 
the medium of his neuronal system, but attentive to it. 
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the constitution or to the understanding of the belief, and one must look to 
S's other beliefs, memories and experiences for the more significant 
determinants of the belief. I have tried to avoid saying that Bp is caused 
by its relevant physical conditions, for the reasons mentioned earlier, viz. 
that this encourages thinking of the belief as identical with only a certain 
neurological state, but it does seem that this particular dependence 
relation is one of generation and at least very similar to a causal 
dependency. 
2.2 Evidential belief 
S may come to have a belief about some way in which the world is 
(say p = the chimney is smoking), not through his own experience of it, but 
indirectly. He may not see the smoking chimney for himself, but learn 
about it from a credible source, or see a fire in the grate and infer p. Bp 
may thus be arrived at by S on the basis of other beliefs of his, in putative 
facts which indicate that p is the case. These beliefs, and what they are 
about, seem to fall into two main classes. 
22.1 Belief in the natural evidence for p: S may come to 
believe that it rained last night (Bp) on the basis of his beliefs that the trees 
are wet (Bq), there are pools on the paths (Br) and the soil is damp (Bs). 
There are natural relations of cause and effect between q, r and s, and p, so 
that the presence of the first three is strongly indicative of p. If awareness 
of these relations is an operative part of S's body of semantic or theoretical 
belief, then, (in the absence of special reasons to the contrary, e.g., S's 
believing his neighbour's sprinkler was on), if S holds q, r and s, he will at 
the same time accept p. An empirical belief that p may thus depend on 
belief in the direct or natural evidence for p, and on the fact that it is such 
evidence being in S's cognizance. It seems also that there are times when 
S's acceptance of certain statistics or objective probabilities can act as a 
kind of evidence for some particular thing's being the case. If S believes 
that the worldwide birthrate is 28,000 per day, then in might occur to him at 
t that, during the last 4 or 5 seconds, a baby has been born on earth-surely 
a particular empirical belief with respect to time and place. 
222 Belief in testimony for p: S may come to believe that it 
rained last night as a result of accepting the statement by a trustworthy 
source that this was so. Here, it is possible to explain the dependence 
relation in one of two ways. Firstly, there is a Humean sort of view on which 
S's belief that a source is reliable has the effect of rendering that source's 
claims of p, into something like direct evidence for p. The direct natural 
evidence that q constitutes for p, is just the highly regular consequence of 
p upon q; granting a source reliability is allowing that its claims of p are 
regularly conjoined with the fact that p. Hence, to allow that a source is 
reliable is to give its productions the status of natural evidence. 
Alternatively, it may be that Bp is arrived at via acceptance of the truth of 
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"p.H If S believes that T has uttered "p," and S believes that T is trustworthy, 
i.e., speaks the truth, then S thereby believes that "p" is true, and so also 
that p is the case. The utterance is now seen as a conventional rather than 
a natural sign of the fact that p. Either way, S's belief in testimony that p 
results in S's belief that p. 
As was also the case with the physical cause/effect array, the 
mere existence of evidential beliefs is normally enough to guarantee that S 
will hold the dependent belief, and here again the "normally" excludes 
irrationality and includes the usual background beliefs of cognitive agents. 
If S sees a fire in the grate and, believing that fire smokes and there are no 
blocking conditions on this one's smoking, yet rejects the proposition that 
this fire is smoking, he does so at the price of being irrational. If T asserts 
that the chimney is smoking, and S, believing T credible, yet holds that 
there is no smoke coming out of the chimney, he is committed to a 
contradiction. We may think of the physical array and evidential beliefs 
as the apprising conditions for empirical belief, since these are what 
inform S of some new state of affairs, or what give him cause to believe that 
something of which he was not previously cognizant, is the case. 
Might there not be many other states which are apprising 
conditions for empirical belief? Memory, intuition, wishful thinking and 
brain-washing are some other ways in which it seems S might come to hold 
an empirical belief. Memory however, can be ruled out on the grounds 
that what S remembers is not a fact new to him but something previously 
believed, and so memory has no apprising force. As for the other three, it 
is true that S may come by their means to hold that p is the case, in 
something very like a doxastic state, a state that plays a belief-like role in 
his functional economy. But these are not the terms of true dependence 
relations of empirical belief, as those relations were defined in 1 above. S 
may be in a state of intuiting or wishfully thinking that p, without accepting 
that it is in fact the case and being ready to commit himself to appropriate 
action; his readiness to act and his conviction (if he does reach one) that 
the proposition is true, in these two cases seems to depend upon his 
having forgotten its dubious origins. A conviction that p which is induced 
in S by brain-washing hypnotism or the like, is similarly not one in which S 
is rationally constrained, simply by virtue of being in that state, to accept p. 
In fact, he would be well advised, and has the reflective capacity, in such 
circumstances to withhold belief in p. S's perception of the fact that p, 
however, either sensorily in a causal physical array, or inferentially, among 
his existent beliefs, is identical with its acceptance by him. 
2 3 Semantic belief 
There is, however, more needed than just the apprising conditions 
in order for S to hold an empirical belief, say, that there are gondolas in 
Venice. He will need besides some sort of concept or understanding of 
gondolas and what they are, and some sort of recognition of Venice and 
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what it is, and these are cognitive capabilities which involve further beliefs 
of his about boats, transport, canals, cities and their identity, and 
ultimately, about things, their properties and relations, their location in 
space and identity over time, "endless interlocked beliefs. The system of 
such beliefs identifies a thought by locating it in a logical and epistemic 
space" (Davidson, 1984:157). This is the familiar Quinean "web of belief," 
the cognitive context without which a psychophysiological state could not 
be a belief, since it would have no semantic content. 
The term "semantic" should not be taken to imply a necessarily 
linguistic element in belief. It would be a nominalistic mistake to insist 
that S have the words "gondola" and "Venice" at his command in order to 
have the belief that there are gondolas in Venice, although being a 
linguistic creature, he will recognize his belief under some suitable 
statement of its content/* and will be disposed to assert and assent to such 
a sentence. "Theoretical" would have done as well, but "semantic" is used 
here since these are the beliefs that invest the representational content of 
Bp with its meaning, rather than its existential import, which seems to be a 
function of the apprising conditions. While both these features of a * 
beliefs representational content—meaning and existential import-are 
expressed in the same proposition, there is at least this difference between 
them: that meaning is general while the ontological commitment of a 
particular empirical belief arises only with the belief. S may have 
command of a whole theory of gondolas and Venice and may entertain the 
thought that there are gondolas in Venice, without having any cause to 
believe there are any particular gondolas there or anywhere at all. 
S does not in any sense infer from his general beliefs about the 
nature of things, together with his particular experience, to the conclusion 
that there are gondolas in Venice; rather the reverse. The general beliefs 
are present in the particular empirical belief and an observer, or S himself 
on reflection, is able to say, that since S has a certain particular empirical 
belief, that he must have certain other general beliefs too. The former is a 
state of readiness to behave in certain ways, the latter is the capacity to 
take up that state in the appropriate context. We might explain such a 
general belief in terms of the disposition to apply a proposition of the form 
(x) (Fx -> Gx), where F represents a quorum of properties perceived by S, 
sufficient for the identification of something as being of a certain kind, and 
G is a conjunction of all the properties (including F) which S thinks belong 
6 There are difficulties in saying what a "suitable statement" would be of 
the proposition that there are gondolas in Venice, for the purposes of 
attributing that belief to S. If the sentence that S holds true as a result of 
seeing gondolas in Venice is "There are odd black boats in the city my 
uncle lives in," does he believe that there are gondolas in Venice? A better 
test than the sentence held true might be S's ability to discriminate 
behaviorally gondolas and Venice from among other boats and cities. 
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to things of that kind. For instance, F = brown, matt, odorous, rectangular, 
sectioned, which is enough for S to recognize a slab of chocolate by. If it is 
chocolate, then it is also (G =) sweet, nutritious, soft, cocoa-flavoured, 
yielding to the teeth, soluble, etc., properties which dispose S to proceed in 
certain ways. If S did not have the general semantic belief that chocolate 
was all these things, he could not recognize it, understand what he was 
looking at, act appropriately towards it, in short, acquire the belief that it 
was chocolate before him. A New Guinea headhunter with no experience 
of such stuff might believe it was a very soft wood. Once again, it seems 
that normally semantic beliefs relevant to the occasion are automatically 
brought into operation. 
Though both particular empirical beliefs and their semantic 
constitutive beliefs are dispositional states, there is the genuine difference 
between them referred to above in the phrase "existential import." 
"Beliefs about particular, spatio-temporally limited, states of affairs have 
been compared to maps...which, taken together, form one great map of the 
world...General beliefs are not part of the map. They are dispositions to 
extend the map according to certain principles" (Armstrong, 1973:99). Talk 
of this kind should not be read as implying the possibility of some 
atheoretical kind of given, or of pure data of experience7 Nevertheless, it 
seems that a general belief of the kind we are calling "semantic" is 
operative only in the company of a cause/effect array (and possibly 
inference), and it is the apprising condition which is essential to S's coming 
to believe that p is the case, and it is also essential to S's coming to believe 
that p is the case, since it is the nature of the experience that determines 
what general beliefs become operative. If S experiences a gondola on a 
canal, he is not at liberty to construe it as an acrobat on a tightrope, or does 
so at the cost of his understanding and effective negotiation of the world. 
2.4 Probabilistic belief 
A probabilistic belief, Bq, is a belief that S holds at t, antecedently 
to being apprised of p, which renders it more or less likely for him that p is 
the case. It bears thus on the credibility of the proposition and disposes S 
to accept or reject it, and to do so with greater or lesser firmness. A 
probabilistic belief is not necessarily about an objective probability; q may 
be any sort of proposition, though it must have some sort of perceived 
bearing for S on the features or context of p, and this relationship is such 
that it can always issue in a formulation, however rough, of the objective 
probability of p. 
Like semantic beliefs, probabilistic beliefs precede S's acquisition 
of, and are applicable to, the particular Bp. The same beliefs may be both 
semantic and probabilistic; what distinguishes them as two kinds is that 
7 For convincing illustrations of how even immediate perceptual belief is 
theory laden, see Churchland 1979: 16-21 and 28-34. 
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the belief they determine, is determined in different ways by each class. 
The base realm of semantic beliefs determines how S will construe an 
experience and what range of actions he will be disposed to in his 
acceptance of p; the base realms of probabilistic beliefs determines the 
degree of credibility that p will have for S, and (sometimes) which among 
several possible semantic construals is the most likely. The example 
above (supra:4) of S's believing there is a tire on his lawn when it is really a 
snake illustrates how S's background beliefs about the likelihood of p may 
deflect its credibility for him onto q, even when his experience suggests p 
more strongly than q to him. 
An experience's representational content may also appear 
incredible to S in the light his beliefs about its or the context's mendacity; 
tromp 1'oeil paintings, wax figures, deliberate deceptions of one sort or 
another will, if S is cognizant of the circumstances, cause him to believe not 
the apparent, but something else 8 The corollary of this is that when, in 
normal circumstance, S believes an ordinary empirical proposition like 
'There is a cat on the mat," his acceptance of the proposition depends on 
his having beliefs about the match of context and content, or about context 
alone, which do not militate against the proposition's credibility. Put into 
dispositional terms, S is predisposed by his general beliefs that mats are a 
likely place to find cats, and his particular beliefs that there is nothing 
untoward about this case, to act as if p were the case when apprised of p. 
Probabilistic beliefs may act to deflect S from the prima facie 
belief in a causal array or in the evidence, but they may also promote such 
belief. S is keen to add a blue-eared starling to his bird list, so he goes to a 
spot where these birds are known to be plentiful and settles near a tree full 
of their favorite fruits. Presently he sees, somewhat obscured, a bird with a 
bluish sheen on its head. He believes that there is a blue-eared starling on 
the branch in front of him. In the presence of his background beliefs 
about the context of his experience, and the high likelihood of the birds 
8 Thus Peacocke (1983:6): "A man may be familiar with a perfect trompe 
I'oeil violin painted on a door, and be sure from his past experience that it 
is a trompe I'oeil: nevertheless his experience may continue to represent a 
violin as hanging on the door in front of him." This should not be read as 
implying that, for a moment, S believes here is a violin before him and 
then remembering his past experience, re-interprets it as a painting; nor I 
think need it entail that the content of experience is hypothetical in 
character-that S considers the image of a violin in the light of his other 
beliefs before deciding what to believe of it. Peacocke's claim is rather that 
S's visual image of a trompe I'oeil violin is qualitatively indistinguishable 
from his image of a real violin, which is consistent with my claim that S's 
immediate experiential belief, depending as it does on image and 
probabilistic background beliefs, is that there is a painting before him, i.e., 
he sees the thing as a painting. 
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occurring in this context, what would otherwise be too sketchy for thinking 
"This is a blue-eared starling," becomes sufficient. No wishful thinking 
need be involved; even for a conscientious and careful believer, if there 
are contextual factors which increase the probability of p, then S's belief 
that such factors exist automatically increases p's credibility for S, or (in 
the case of an inferential belief) decreases the need for evidence or 
grounds. Conversely, if S were to see a blue-eared sitting on his back fence 
in broad daylight, he would probably not believe his eyes, simply because 
it is so unlikely a situation to find one of these rare birds in. 
So much for immediate belief. Here is a comparative example of 
how inferential belief depends on probabilistic beliefs. S goes into his 
garden in the early morning and sees that the shrubs are wet, there are 
pools on the paths and the soil is damp. If it is in December, S concludes 
that it rained in the night; if it is in June, S thinks that his neighbour's 
sprinkler has been on. The first belief depends on S's further beliefs about 
the likelihood of rain being high in December; the second, on his beliefs 
about rain being almost unheard of in June. This example illustrates too 
that Bp is not typically arrived at by S's inferring it from premisses of 
probabilistic beliefs plus experiential or evidential beliefs. That the 
experience or evidence assumes one particular character for S, rather than 
another, is explicable in the light of his background beliefs. 
There are (at least) two possible objections to regarding these 
probabilistic beliefs as dependence conditions for empirical belief. Firstly, 
does empirical belief essentially depend upon such beliefs? Aren't they 
rather an adjunct to a particular empirical belief, perhaps acting in the 
exceptional case to bar or admit belief, but normally playing a merely 
cautionary or confirmatory role? A probabilistic belief disposes S to accept 
or reject p with greater or lesser firmness (supra:8). Surely the implication 
of this, in conjunction with the thesis of apprising conditions in 2.1 and 2.2 
above, is that probabilistic beliefs are not essential to the acceptance of an 
empirical fact. If this objection can be answered, and it can be shown that 
they are necessary, then a second question may be raised: are 
probabilistic beliefs in any real sense different from the particular 
empirical belief they "determine," or should they not rather be regarded as 
identical with it? The degree of p's subjective probability for S at t is surely 
just the more or less firmly held belief that p is the case. And if this is so, 
there can once again, though for a different reason, be not talk of 
dependence of the one on the other. The first objection would have it that 
probabilistic beliefs are only contingently related to an empirical belief, 
the second, that they are in a relation of identity; either way, the relation is 
not one of dependence. 
I lack space here to deal fully with these objections, but think that 
both can be defeated. Firstly, that p's likelihood in terms of S's other 
relevant empirical beliefs, is necessary for Bp, and that p's acceptance 
after an initial rejection depends on a revision of those other beliefs, may 
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be established both by exemplification and an argument on coherentist 
lines which equates credibility with acceptability, with the consistency of p 
with S's whole doxastic set. Secondly, it may be granted that p's subjective 
probability for S at t is nothing but the sum of his other beliefs which bear 
on p's likelihood, so long as we remember that this is not all there is to a 
particular empirical belief. There are also the apprising and semantic 
conditions, so that Bp cannot be completely identified with the 
probabilistic beliefs it depends upon. That they are an integral part of Bp 
is not a difficulty for, but a vindication of, the dependency thesis. 
3. Conclusions 
I have said almost nothing about a different kind of dependence 
relation of empirical beliefs—their occurring at the instance of the agent's 
interests, needs, values. Since a belief is a means-choice disposition, it is 
integrally related to the agent's purposes, and he acquires beliefs about 
things only as he conceives them in functional interaction with himself.9 
However, it is incumbent on agents to discount their immediate local 
interests in forming empirical beliefs. Given that absolute truth is a value 
to which all empirical belief aspires and that all normal rational agents are 
in consequence type-identical in their relations with the material world, the 
needs and interests upon which empirical beliefs essentially depend will 
be the same across the board. The teleological relations of empirical 
belief may thus have less, or a different kind of, determinative power than 
the four discussed above. Still, values represent a base realm which would 
require investigation in any full study of the dependence relations of 
empirical belief. There may be others. 
Returning to the four conditions set out above, it is fairly safe to 
say that any particular empirical belief is determined in part by apprising 
conditions, by semantic and by probabilistic beliefs of the agent. The first 
gives S reason to think that p is the case; the second gives p a cognitive 
content that S can grasp; the third gives p acceptability in terms of S's 
other empirical beliefs. 
This thesis has various applications. What, on a purely 
propositional view of belief, would be the same belief (i.e., belief in the one 
proposition) may depend to different degrees on these three terms, in 
different agents or the same agent at different times. For instance, agents 
Q, R and S all believe that there are dugongs in the Sargasso. Q has 
encountered them, though he does not have their or their location's name; 
R has forgotten how he came by the fact and has only the sketchiest idea 
of what dugongs or the Sargasso are, but p's intersubjective assertibility 
has confirmed him in Bp; S extrapolates on evolutionary principles from 
9 For a definition of belief as essentially the choice of a means to satisfy an 
individual's "ensemble of ends," see Goldstick (I989:passim). 
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what he knows of marine animals and their habitats to Bp. It seems 
reasonable to say that the physical array of which Q is a part is centrally 
determinative of Q's Bp (belief de re); that whatever substance R's Bp has 
is derived from R's semantic beliefs (de dido); and that S's Bp is a 
hypothesis that depends in the main probabilistically on other beliefs of S. 
How these three instances of the "same" belief differ is thus explicable 
with reference to the different dependence relations of each. It is still the 
case that all three terms (apprising conditions, semantic and probabilistic 
beliefs) must be present in each belief. 
There are also implications in this dependency thesis for 
empirical justification, in particular for the traditional standoff between 
coherentists and foundationalists. If the physical cause/effect array is 
indeed a determining factor of some empirical beliefs, then there is at 
least one important respect in which they are not dependent on the 
existing beliefs of S at t, and in which it might therefore be argued their 
justification cannot consist in relations of coherence. In the case of 
inferential beliefs too, it seems that their epistemic status, and so perhaps 
their justification too, may consist in relations of at least three different 
kinds. 
APPENDIX-SEVEN ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT EMPIRICAL BEUEF 
1. Empirical belief is belief about some way in which the world is. As 
such, it has a guaranteed extension, since it is correct to say in any 
particular case that, of spacetime region xy, S believes p. Empirical belief 
is not of course guaranteed true; what S believes of xy may always be false. 
2 A single empirical beliefs content is specifiable in a proposition 
which is also a statement of (supposed) material fact and which is made 
true by the obtaining of that fact. The focus in this paper is on the doxastic 
state of an individual agent, and an egocentric view of a "fact" will 
therefore be taken, from which, talk of putative or supposed facts is 
natural. 
3. Toothaches (and somatic sensations in general) do not represent 
the world as being a certain way to S, but are the immediate experience of 
his own psychophysiological states and are thus not empirical doxastic 
states, though S may infer from such an experience the empirical belief 
that his tooth is decayed. A hallucination that there are rats on the floor, 
while it also is a experience of nothing outside S's own neurological system, 
is nevertheless empirical since its reference is "some way in which the 
world is." 
4 The assumption will be that there is more to a belief than a 
positive, negative or neutral attitude to a proposition; there is also (at least) 
its character, including, in the case of empirical belief, sensory and 
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indexical elements, and sometimes qualia too; its setting in the unique 
doxastic set of each agent, which partially determines what sort of content 
the belief has; and its causal history—an empirical belief is acquired it 
seems through (varying degrees of) the instrumental agency of the sensory 
mechanisms. In countering the rooted inclination to take a belief as only 
+p, -p/ or ?p, it helps to think of Bp as "the doxastic psychological state that 
p." A corollary of this view of belief, is that experience is essentially 
doxastic in character. 
5. The underlying philosophy of mind here is materialistic, weakly 
non-reductive. The intentional idiom is useful for its convenience and to 
make up for our neurophysiological ignorance, but beliefs, especially 
empirical beliefs, and their contents, could in principle be completely 
understood in extensional terms. Psychophysiological naivete is 
responsible for the seeming anomalousness of the mental. A single 
grossly defined extensional array might serve as the base of many 
intensionally specified beliefs, but to each such belief there corresponds a 
unique fully defined physical base in which cortical states are fully 
particularized. If a cortical state is a belief state, it disposes S to behave in 
a certain way. A belief is thus a state which arises within the physical order 
at the instance of natural causes and effects. 
6. It is the dependence relations of a single empirical belief of an 
agent S at a time t, rather than his belief about the world in general that 
will be explicated, with this proviso, that the idea of an individual belief is a 
convenient artifice, conclusions about which should be generalized to the 
undifferentiated empirical belief of the agent. This seems advisable in the 
light of the fact that the complex psychological state which includes S's 
expectations and his current and remembered experience, i.e., his 
doxastic state vis a vis the world, if exhaustively specified in terms of single 
belief states at t, would yield an enormous, though not I think infinite, 
number of beliefs. 
7. There is a serious, epistemic kind of believing in which a belief, 
albeit a subjective probability, is not conditional in character or a 
hypothesis to be tested in action, but a proposition held with some 
conviction, to whose truth S is committed. 
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